Too much cryptoJean-Philippe AumassonAbstract:We show that many symmetric cryptography primitives would not be less safe with significantly fewer rounds. To support this claim, we review the cryptanalysis progress in the last 1492 years, examine the reasons behind the current number of rounds, and analyze the risk of doing fewer rounds. Advocating a rational and scientific approach to round numbers selection, we propose revised number of rounds for AES, BLAKE2, ChaCha, and SHA-3, which offer more consistent security margins across primitives and make them much faster, without increasing the security risk.Category / Keywords:secret-key cryptography / cryptanalysis, AES, BLAKE2, ChaCha, SHA-3Date:received (Dec) **************************Contact author:jeanphilippe aumasson at gmail comAvailable format (s):PDF|BibTeX CitationNote:Presented at Real-World Crypto 01575879Version:
: All versions of this report) Short URL:ia.cr/193804 / 2019[Cryptology ePrint archive]Read More
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